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During the 1990s American leaders and many others in the West viewed Russia as the
most important test case for a transition to democracy. Today the consensus of scholarly
analyses in the West concludes that, if Russia did enter a transition to democracy, that
transition was not successful. This article attempts to suggest some of the main lessons
about democratization that may be derived from the study of the experience of post-
communist Russia, seen in a comparative perspective.
The thesis that the ﬁrst competitive national election after the downfall of an authoritarian
regime marks a decisive breakthrough for forces striving for democratization has not
proved true for Russia. Yet the withering of democracy and the consolidation of a semi-
authoritarian regime followed the period of competitive elections in Russia.
In the early and mid-1990s scholars who had specialized in the study of communist
regimes warned that the post-communist states would need to carry out radical economic
and social changes as well as sweeping political transformation. In Russia, however, the
consequences of a corrupted process of privatization of state assets were enormously
damaging for the institutionalization of democracy.
As was shown in a number of countries in the 1970s and 1980s, a strong civil society can
play an important role in a nation’s transition to democracy. The barriers to the devel-
opment of civil society within the Soviet system and the conditions causing weakness in
social organizations in post-communist Russia made it easier for members of the elite to
subvert reform and guaranteed that there would be fewer restraints on the tendency
toward more authoritarian control after 2000.
Among post-communist nations, those in which a consensus of most segments of the elite
and the public was committed to a radical break with the old system have been much
more successful in carrying out marketization and democratization. The combination of
historical conditions that had created a strong anti-communist consensus in most of
Eastern Europe had not taken shape in Russia. The absence of a fusion of democratization
and national liberation in Russia explained the lack of a clear national consensus in favor of
political and economic transformation.
One of the main lessons from the course of events in Russia from the early 1990s to the
present is that change away from one form of authoritarian rule, which usually has been
labeled as a transition to democracy, is not irreversible. Some democratic transitions may
prove to be shallow, and the changes in post-communist Russia have provided a good
example of a shallow transition. The scholarly literature on transitions to democracy thatPaciﬁc Research Center, Hanyang University. Produced and distributed by Elsevier Limited. All rights reserved.
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gankov for their comments on an earlier version ofappeared after the early 1980s departed from earlier writings’ emphasis on the growth of
social, economic, and cultural conditions for the institutionalization of democracy in the
political system. The experience of Russia may encourage us to return to the study of the
long-term trends facilitating or inhibiting the growth of democratic institutions.
Copyright  2010, Asia-Paciﬁc Research Center, Hanyang University. Produced and
distributed by Elsevier Limited. All rights reserved.1. Introduction1
After the middle of the 1970s authoritarian regimes
were replaced in many countries, and the political systems
in a number of those countries showed signs of becoming
more democratic, in some cases experiencing changes of
apparently fundamental importance. Most of the nations
that experienced the dramatic growth of democratic
features in their governmental institutions and political
processes in the 1970s and 1980s were in Southern Europe
(Spain, Portugal, and Greece) and South America (Brazil,
Chile, and others). A large number of scholarly writings
attempted to develop comparative generalizations about
transitions to democracy based on the evidence gleaned
from the transformations that had taken place in those
countries. Then in the late 1980s startling changes began
in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. In the 1990s, after
the Soviet bloc disappeared and the Soviet Union itself
fragmented, the leaders of many states that had been
under communist rule announced that they were deter-
mined to institutionalize the principles of democracy. As
a result there was a burst of unbounded optimism con-
cerning the prospects for the triumph of democracy in
most of the nations of the world. As Martin Dimitrov has
reported, “When the Berlin Wall fell, political scientists
were wildly optimistic about the global spread of democ-
racy” (Dimitrov, 2008, 24). Samuel Huntington believed
that scores of countries in different regions of the world
had been swept up in a “third wave” of democratization
(Huntington, 1991). Francis Fukuyama argued that there
was no longer any viable alternative to the liberal demo-
cratic model for political and economic institutions
(Fukuyama, 1992). Larry Diamond published an article
titled, “The Global Imperative: Building a DemocraticWorld
Order” (1994), and some scholars envisioned a world in
which all major states would be liberal democracies (Smith,
2007, 116).
Such optimism proved infectious, and political leaders
in the USA were receptive to the inﬂuence of superﬁcial
interpretations of the writings of academic specialists. It
should be noted that the scholars in the ﬁeld of political
science who produced the most inﬂuential writings on
transitions to democracy (the so-called “transitologists”)
hedged their generalizations with qualiﬁcations that often
were disregarded by journalists and politicians. For
example, Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter said
that a volume they authored dealt with “transitions from
certain authoritarian regimes toward an uncertaining and Andrei Tsy-
this essay.‘something else,’” which could consist of democracy or “a
new, and possibly more severe, form of authoritarian rule”
(O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986, 3).2 Perhaps those scholars
should not be held responsible for the policy decisions of
the political leaders who chose to interpret the nuanced
ﬁndings of academic research in an oversimpliﬁed manner.
Nevertheless, as Thomas Carothers attests, at the height
of enthusiasm for democratization in the 1980s and 1990s,
Western advocates of democracy promotion “embraced
the view that democracy could succeed anywhere, and
could do so quickly” (Carothers, 2007, 24), and were willing
to believe that any country whose leaders offered any
political opening was in a “transition to democracy”
(Carothers, 1997, 92). We should recognize that optimism
about the potential (if not the inevitability) of imitation
of the values of American democracy by other nations had
been a traditional theme in the political culture of the
United States (Kagan, 2008) since the late eighteenth
century. It is obvious that the discussion of transitions to
democracy by political scientists had not created such
hopes, but it did help to heighten expectations among
politicians and the public for the rapid spread of
democracy until it would be overwhelmingly dominant in
the world.
During the 1990s the country that was viewed by
American leaders and many others in the West as the most
important test case for a transition to democracy was
Russia. The Clinton administration emphasized that one
of its highest priorities in foreign policy was the success of
the movement to democracy and a market economy in
the states of the former Soviet Union (Christopher, 1993;
Talbott, 1993a). US Secretary of State Warren Christopher
asserted that “helping the Russian people to build a free
society and market economy is the greatest strategic chal-
lenge of our time,” and that “Russia was the single most
important foreign policy priority” of the Clinton adminis-
tration (Marsden, 2005, 47). Russia is by far the largest of
the former republics of the USSR in both population and
land area; indeed, it is the largest country in the world in
terms of territory. In addition, its geographical location
gives it inﬂuence on issues in several regions in which the
USA is interested, and it has greater strategic military
capability than any other country except the United States.
On a deeper level, psychologically, as the main successor
of Soviet Union, Russia represents the core of the former
superpower that had been the main geopolitical and
ideological rival of the USA from the late 1940s until the2 It is worth noting that the subtitle of that volume, the single most
widely quoted book about democratization by “transitologists,” is
“Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies.”
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superpower that was the main adversary of democracy
could, within a relatively short time, be changed into an
ideological soul mate of our country, the symbolic impli-
cations would be profound.
And yet, as the current decade nears its end, the
consensus of scholarly analyses and popular perceptions in
the West indicates that, if Russia did enter a transition to
democracy, that transition was not successful. From the
point of view of those in the United States and Western
Europe who had high hopes for the spread of democracy,
the most important test case for democratization was
largely a disappointment.3 During the 1990s, while Boris
Yeltsinwas the president of Russia, mostWestern academic
specialists regarded that country as a democracy that was
in an early stage of transition, with some imperfections
that did not negate the fundamentally democratic char-
acter of the political regime. Within a few years after Vla-
dimir Putin became the president of that country, however,
the assessment of that regime by most political scientists
specializing in the study Russia changed. Between 2000
and 2005 the outlook of Russia watchers in the West
shifted, so that many began to refer to the political system
of that country as authoritarian (Hahn, 2004; McFaul,
2004). Stephen Whiteﬁeld has noted that during Putin’s
time as president of Russia, there was an “increasing
consensus among scholars, journalists, and policy-makers
in the West” that Russian politics had moved “signiﬁcantly
off a democratic pathway” (Whiteﬁeld, 2009, 93). Consid-
ering both the undemocratic features and the elements of
pluralism remaining in Russian politics, however, it would
seem justiﬁable to apply Marina Ottaway’s category of
“semi-authoritarian” (Ottaway, 2003) to the Russian polit-
ical system. Most Western scholars who focus on that
country would seem to agree with Steven Fish’s assertion
that “democratization has failed in Russia” (Fish, 2005, 81).
What lessons about the conditions affecting transitions
to democracy can be learned from the study of Russia’s
experience of apparently unsuccessful democratization in
the post-Soviet period? We may ask how much the model
for a successful transition to democracy that was created by
some scholars in the 1980s has proved applicable to Russia.
That model was developed in response to dramatic changes
in the political systems of countries in Southern Europe and
South America. By the middle of the 1990s there was
a debate in scholarly circles about the degree to which
generalizations derived from the study of political trans-
formation in those countries might be proved valid with
respect to nations that formerly were under communist
rule (Bunce, 1995; Schmitter and Karl, 1994). Perhaps
enough time has passed to make it possible to shed more3 The interpretation that sees political change in Russia from the early
1990s to the present in terms of a failed transition to democracy is not the
only possible framework for perceiving change in that country during
that period, of course. The writings of many Russian scholars and the
speeches of a number of Russian politicians would frame change in other
perspectives. One interpretation that is popular in Russia depicts
a breakdown of order in the late 1980s and early 1990s, leading to a “time
of troubles” under Boris Yeltsin, followed by a restoration of order and the
revival of national pride under Vladimir Putin after 2000.light on that question. Also, there is now a substantial
scholarly literature on post-communist political trends,
which permits us to compare Russia’s experience after
the disintegration of the Soviet system with that of other
nations that formerly were under communist rule. A
number of scholars have remarked on the high degree of
diversity in the trajectories of change among the post-
communist countries, which in the political sphere have
produced results ranging from thoroughly authoritarian
states to democracies that function much like those of
Western Europe (Ekiert and Hanson, 2003, 29, 31; Ekiert,
2003, 91, 94; Pop-Eleches, 2005, 2). In fact, Herbert Kit-
schelt has concluded that “there is no region or set of
countries on earth with a currently larger diversity of
political regimes” than is found in the post-communist
segment of the world (Kitschelt, 2003, 49). We may expect
that revealing insights will emerge from the contrast
between political change in Russia and that in other post-
communist nations. We should admit, however, that in this
article, space does not permit us to attempt an exhaustive
discussion of the factors conditioning the results of
democratization in Russia in comparative perspective.
This article will attempt to contribute to an ongoing
discussion by suggesting some of the main lessons about
democratization that may be derived from the study of the
experience of post-communist Russia, seen in a compara-
tive perspective.4
2. The electoral fallacy
By the early 1990s those in theWestwho enthusiastically
supported the promotion of democracy attached great
importance to the “founding election” in a new democracy.
They assumed that in a country that had been under an
authoritarian regime, the ﬁrst election in which different
parties competed would be a breakthrough of change, an
important starting point in the transition to democracy
(Schraeder, 2002, 229), and “the primary indicator of demo-
craticprogress” (Marsden,2005,135). The institutionalization
of electoral competition in a series of elections was thought
to be “sufﬁcient to consolidate democracy” (Rose and Shin,
2001, 332). Thomas Carothers has observed that democracy
promoters tended “to overestimate the power of elections
to produce fundamental political change” (Carothers, 2007,
24). The dominant school of thought in the USA during
the 1990s (and to a lesser extent inWestern Europe) believed
that Russia had gone through a breakthrough toward
democratization during the early 1990s, and that Russia
subsequently faced the task of consolidating the features of
its infant democracy (McFaul,1999,117). Michael McFaul and
Sarah Mendelson took comfort in the fact that elections had
become “the only legitimate means to power in post-Soviet
Russia,” and added, “the emergence of electoral democracy,4 One question that this article will not address is that of the impact of
the efforts of outside actors, such as foreign governments, international
organizations, foundations, and transnational NGOs, on the results of
attempted democratization in Russia. A good analysis of democracy
promotion in Russia by the Clinton administration of the USA is that of
Marsden (2005). This author is preparing an essay evaluating the United
States government’s policies affecting democratization in Russia.
5 It also is true that, in addition to public relations gimmicks and illegal
actions, a genuinely high level of approval from the Russian public has
been a very important asset for Putin and his associates.
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tionary achievement” (McFaul and Mendelson, 2000, 332).
After all, post-Soviet Russia had held its ﬁrst competitive
election for its national parliament in December 1993, in
which a large number of parties supported candidates.
If one competitive national election is a sign of a break-
through to democracy, then Russia should havemade a good
start on the road to democracy by the time the votes from
its ﬁrst multiparty election were counted. And yet, even
though various parties competed in parliamentary elections
in Russia in 1993, 1995, 1999, 2003, and 2007, and elections
for the presidency took place in the post-communist period
in1996, 2000, 2004, and2008 (with real competition in1996
and some competition in 2000), Russia has moved toward
greater authoritarianism during the last several years. The
decline in political pluralism is reﬂected in the fact that in
election results the ruling United Russia Party has steadily
increased its dominance, as it won more than 64 percent of
the vote for the lower house of the national parliament (the
Duma) in December 2007, and has received over 70 percent
of the vote in each of the last two presidential elections. The
transfer of presidential power fromVladimir Putin to Dmitrii
Medvedev during 2007–2008 was managed smoothly
within the highest level of the political elite, so that the
results of the presidential election in 2008 were carefully
predetermined. The stage of the ﬁrst competitive elections
was followed by the withering of democracy and the
consolidation of a semi-authoritarian regime.
Earlier writings about transitions to democracy assumed
that during the period of a breakthrough, the main threat
to greater pluralism would be the potential of a coup by
forces seeking to restore the old authoritarian system
who would eliminate competitive elections if they were
successful in seizing power. The assumption that the danger
of such a coup “hangs like a sword of Damocles over the
possible outcome” of a transition to democracy (O’Donnell
and Schmitter, 1986, 23) reﬂected the fact that in Southern
Europe and South America the prevalent form of an
authoritarian regime had been one in which the military
held power. In sharp contrast, in post-communist Russia
a group from the ruling circles, consisting of Vladimir Putin
and his closest supporters, has concentrated almost
unchecked power in its hands, and has continued parlia-
mentary and presidential elections, but has mastered tech-
niques that make it possible for the ruling faction to
manipulate the mass media, political parties, and public
opinion so thoroughly that the outcome of a national elec-
tion is always a foregone conclusion. Andrew Wilson’s
highly insightful work, Virtual Politics, describes those
techniques in vivid detail (Wilson, 2005), and that book
has enriched our knowledge of the means that are used
to substitute the appearance of competition for real
pluralism in Russian politics. Wilson shows that Putin did
not invent the techniques of manipulating the voters to
predetermine the results of elections; Boris Yeltsin and
others, including regional chief executives and the leaders of
some other post-Soviet states, began to develop those
techniques in the 1990s. AsWilsonputs it, “the Putin era has
only perfected techniques thatwere already commonunder
Yeltsin, and already commonelsewhere in the formerUSSR”
(2005, 39), and “the Yeltsin and Putin eras can be plotted atdifferent points on the same learning curve” (266). Wilson
adds that under Putin, “the Kremlin has simply got better at
ﬁxing elections” (ibid.). Alexander Lukin agrees that during
the post-Soviet years, “elections became more and more
fraudulent and subject to manipulation” (Lukin, 2009, 87).5
In summary, the idea that the ﬁrst competitive national
election after the downfall of an authoritarian regimemarks
a decisive breakthrough for forces striving for democrati-
zation (a notion that undoubtedly was valid in some earlier
cases) has not proved true of Russia at all.3. The legacy of economic reform under Yeltsin
The model of change offered by those who had exam-
ined the experience of countries that had carried out tran-
sitions to democracy in the 1970s and 1980s in Southern
Europe and South America focused primarily on the goals
and actions of groups in each nation’s political elite (Smith,
2007, 130; Schmitz, 2004, 406). That approach contrasted
sharply with decades of previous research that had
emphasized the importance of building up the economic
and social prerequisites for democracy (Carothers, 1997, 92;
Smith, 2007, 126–127). Thomas Carothers summarizes the
outlook embodied in the new model: “So long as the elites
in a country embraced the democratic idealdsomething
elites everywhere seemed to be doingddemocracy would
spring into being” (Carothers, 1997, 92). Political leaders in
the USA focused intently on interactionswithin the national
political elite when they looked at political events in post-
Soviet Russia. The pronouncements of high-ranking ofﬁ-
cials in the Clinton administrationwho played the principal
role in shaping policy toward Russia revealed a strong
tendency to dichotomize factions in the political elite of
that country between those who were seen as favoring
democracy and those who were on the side opposed to
democracy. President Clinton and others typically depicted
the struggle going on in Russia as if it were a confrontation
between the forces of light and the forces of darkness.
Strobe Talbott, the main ofﬁcial in the administration
specializing on policy toward Russia, spoke of a Manichean
struggle between supporters and opponents of democracy
in that country: “On the one side. were the forces of the
past, of the old Soviet Union and the old Soviet system .
On the other side were the forces of the new Russia,
personiﬁed by President Yeltsin, committed to democracy,
reform, respect for human life, and civic pride” (Talbott,
1993b). A similar perspective was found in the writings of
some scholars, although in a bit more sophisticated and
complex form. The Clinton administration asserted
repeatedly that Boris Yeltsin was committed to democracy
and a market economy and placed its bet on him as the
person who would lead Russia into the community of
democratic nations. That administration saw the Commu-
nist Party of the Russian Federation and extreme national-
ists like Vladimir Zhirinovsky as posing the main potential
threat to reverse the changes introduced by Yeltsin.
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actual character of the changes that were generated by
the Yeltsin leadership was highly mixed. On the one
hand, Yeltsin was determined to prevent the Communists
from returning to power; he did allow greater freedom of
expression than Russia had known before (though in that
area he continued changes that Mikhail Gorbachev had
initiated in the Soviet Union); he did permit rapid growth
in the number of political parties legally operating in
Russia; and he did make a commitment to abandoning
major parts of the Soviet economic model. In their totality,
though, the changes that occurred under the Yeltsin
administration presented a very mixed picture. In many
areas there was a wide gap between Yeltsin’s statements
on fundamental principles and the changes that took place
in practice while he was president of Russia. To borrow
from the language of the Soviet Marxists, in Yeltsin's legacy
there was a lack of unity of theory and practice. We have
already mentioned the beginning of techniques of manip-
ulation of voters and elections under Yeltsin’s leadership in
the 1990s.
This section of the article will concentrate on the
character of the transformation of Russia’s economy that
was guided by Yeltsin’s policies. In the early and mid-
1990s, when some scholars were debating the possible
differences between earlier transitions to democracy and
the path that lay ahead for the post-communist states of
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, those who
had specialized in the study of communist regimes
warned that the post-communist states would need to
carry out radical economic and social changes as well as
sweeping political transformation (Bunce, 1995, 121). In
the countries that had embarked on transitions to
democracy in the 1970s and 1980s, the institutions of
capitalist market economies had already been in place
before dramatic political change had begun, but the post-
communist states that wanted democracy and a market
economy would attempt to move toward both at the
same time. That observation has proved to be particularly
pertinent. The central thesis of the literature of the 1980s
on transitions to democracy was that pacts between
factions in the elite were of crucial signiﬁcance in
bringing the end of authoritarian rule and the break-
through to democracy (Bunce, 2004, 220). A pact based
on compromise, “bridging” the differences between
moderate defenders of authoritarianism and moderate
leaders of the democratic opposition, was thought to be
most favorable for a successful transition from authori-
tarian to democratic governance.
As the record of experience of post-communist change
accumulated, however, empirically grounded works by
Joel Hellman and Michael McFaul demonstrated that the
thesis of the importance of pacted transitions for ushering
in successful democratization was inapplicable to the
post-communist countries (Hellman, 1998; McFaul, 2002).
Valerie Bunce remarks that what we discover among post-
communist states is “that the opposite strategydthat is,
breakage, not bridgingdemerges as the most successful
approach to political and economic transformation” (Bunce,
2004, 222). Steven Fish has shown a strong relationship
between the degree of economic transformation and thedegree of political transformation among countries
formerly under communist rule (Fish, 1998, 1999, 2005).
Post-communist countries in which reformers committed
to radical political and economic changes gained control
usually made successful transitions to democracy, while
the nations in which there were pacts between moderate
reformers and members of the old ruling elite typically
got bogged down in incomplete change, stalemating the
movement toward democracy (and creating greater
potential for movement back toward more authoritarian
rule). Bunce has observed that “in the post-communist
world, there is a very high correlation between democrati-
zation and economic reform” (Bunce, 2004, 223), and that
among post-communist countries, the relationship
between democratization and successful market reform is
“robust and positive” (Bunce, 2001, 54, 59).
In the political sphere, as we have seen, Russia falls
in the category of the cases of compromised and incom-
plete democratic transitions. The relationship between
economic transformation and democratization in post-
communist countries that has been identiﬁed in compar-
ative perspective by scholars such as Hellman, McFaul,
Bunce, and Fish can help us understand the political
consequences of the form of economic reform in Russia in
the 1990s. Though Boris Yeltsin made an emphatic
commitment to fundamental economic transformation on
the level of theory, he made a series of compromises in
practice that prevented his economic reforms from reach-
ing some of their central goals. Most importantly, the
integrity of the privatization of state economic enterprises
was undermined when the Yeltsin administration, under
political pressure, allowed people with political skills
and connections to exploit the process of distribution of
shares in those enterprises to amass assets for their own
purposes (Gill and Markwick, 2000, 213). In the ﬁrst major
stage of privatization during 1992 and 1993, factory direc-
tors were able to gain control of most of the shares that
were supposed to belong to theworkers in their enterprises
(Rutland, 1994, 1109, 1113, 1124; Appel, 1997, 1427;
Goldman, 2003, 81–82). As Dimitri Simes says, “the prin-
cipal beneﬁciaries of privatization were the remnants of
the old nomenklatura and speculators out to make a quick
ruble” (Simes, 1999, 146–147). During the next few years
the transfer of massive state assets to bankers and indus-
trialists who were close to the government accelerated,
aided by scams such as the “loans for shares” program
(Appel, 2004, 97). Thus within a short time, privatization
“created a powerful small circle of fabulously wealthy
business elitesdthe so-called ‘oligarchs’” (Appel, 2004,
104).
As it had been envisioned by US Secretary of State
Warren Christopher, privatization in Russia was supposed
to create millions of independent property owners and
foster the growth of a middle class with a commitment to
continued reform, (Marsden, 2005, 75). In reality, however,
the manner in which privatization took place insured that
the new economic elite of Russia was created by the state
and remained closely tied to the state (Easter, 2008, 212;
Gustafson, 1999, 111–112; Rutland, 2001, 19). Not only did
the oligarchs depend on the state for their status; they also
had great inﬂuence in the national and regional
6 O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986, 48, 54) did acknowledge that in some
countries, once a movement toward democratization had become
evident, there had been a surge of activism by social groups that had
exerted “strong pressures to expand the limits of mere liberalization and
partial democratization.” They did not see popular pressures as a major
factor behind the initial decisions that had created an opening for
democratization.
7 Similarly, Wood (2000, 17) says of democratization that “nearly all
transitions combine elements ‘from above’ with elements ‘from below.’”
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fact that some of them periodically occupied high-ranking
posts in the national government (Gill andMarkwick, 2000,
219), and played a role in decisions about the choice of
executive leaders (Goldman, 2003, 139). Olga Kryshta-
novskaya and Stephen White afﬁrm, “it began to appear as
if the state itself had been ‘privatized,’ and that all impor-
tant decisions were being made by a small group of
ﬁnancial magnates” (Kryshtanovskaya and White, 2005,
294). The oligarchs, some of whom controlled media
outlets, became an indispensable part of Yeltsin’s base of
support. Their ﬁnancial contributions and their manipula-
tion of television coverage helped to deliver victory for
Yeltsin in the Russia presidential election of 1996 even
though his popularity had fallen drastically. The oligarchs
were also a source of funding for political parties and the
governors of the regions. In short, “the oligarchy and its
allies represented a fusion of ﬁnancial and industrial capital
with direct access to government” (Sakwa, 2008, 468).
The consequences of the corrupted process of privat-
ization of state assets were enormously damaging for the
institutionalization of democracy in Russia. After the end
of the 1990s, Joseph Stiglitz observed that “privatization, as
it was imposed in Russia . undermined conﬁdence in
government, in democracy, and in reform” (Stiglitz, 2002,
159). The majority of Russians felt that they had been
deceived by a process of privatization that had failed to
produce the beneﬁts that had been promised to them
(Appel, 2004, 90). As a result of insider privatization, the
broad majority of Russians did not feel themselves to be
stakeholders in the new economic system, while they saw
a class of “new Russians” ﬂaunting their newfound wealth
(Appel, 1997, 1434). Most Russians found that their living
standards were declining sharply, while a small minority
became conspicuously better off (Appel, 2004, 98;
Goldman, 2003, 3). Surveys that were taken several years
after the Yeltsin government had launched economic
transformation revealed that most Russians believed that
privatization had mainly beneﬁted members of the old
nomenklatura class and organized crime groups (Gustafson,
1999, 42). Opinion surveys demonstrated that the course
of privatization had been accompanied by “declining
hopes and skepticism toward the overall direction of
the economic transformation” (DeBardeleben, 1999, 456).
The power and privileges of the oligarchs, along with the
growth of organized crime and corruption in the 1990s,
undermined the legitimacy of the political regime headed
by Boris Yeltsin, and made most Russians skeptical about
the merits of democracy in the style in which it was pre-
sented in Russia. Western leaders, particularly in the Clin-
ton administration, had portrayed Yeltsin as leading the
drive for democracy and a market economy, but in balance
Yeltsin’s legacy damaged the potential for successful
democratization in Russia and helped to set the stage for
the consolidation of more authoritarian control under
Putin.
4. The weakness of Russian civil society
The most inﬂuential Western scholars who wrote
about transitions to democracy in the 1980s focusedprimarily on maneuvering and agreements at the level of
political elites (Bermeo, 1990, 361). The generalizations
offered by those scholars on the basis of changes that had
taken place in some countries in Southern Europe and
South America placed little emphasis on pressures from
the masses and activity by popular organizations, such
as labor unions, in democratic transitions (Collier, 1999, 5,
5, 110; Edles, 1995, 362). Some of the literature on
democratization suggested that too much mass mobili-
zation and pressure from below could endanger the
success of a democratic transition (Bermeo, 1997, 305).6
We must note, however, that other scholars have carried
out research that has called into question the accuracy of
those assumptions even with regard to some of the
countries that made successful transitions to democracy
in the 1970s and 1980s. Several researchers have argued
that forces in civil society played a much larger role in
such transitions in some countries in Southern Europe
and Latin America than was originally supposed (Bermeo,
1997, 309). Recently Monica Threlfall has argued that
organized groups in civil society in Spain exerted strong
pressure to replace authoritarian political institutions
(Threlfall, 2008), a factor in the dynamic of change that
earlier writings on Spain’s widely admired transition had
neglected. Several scholars have presented evidence that
in some cases of successful democratization, the labor
movement exerted a crucial inﬂuence on the calculations
of factions in the political elite by creating pressures that
were potentially destabilizing (Collier and Mahoney, 1997,
285–286; Collier, 1999, 127). Elisabeth Jean Wood has
documented the way in which political mobilization in
the working class in South Africa and El Salvador forced
elite ﬁgures in the political regime of each country to
negotiate a transition to democracy (Wood, 2000, 10).
Ruth Berins Collier concludes, “in most cases the politics
of democratization is a combination of processes from
above and below” (Collier, 1999, 20).7 So the scholarly
literature on transitions to democracy has increasingly
recognized the importance of the inﬂuence of social
groups and mass organizations in democratic transitions
outside the sphere of post-communist countries.
The trend should encourage us to reexamine the
assumptions, common in earlier writings, that organiza-
tions in civil society would not play much of a role in
a transition to democracy, and that the strength of civil
society was not particularly relevant to the chances for
successful democratization. The Western conception of
civil society refers to the sphere of the largely indepen-
dent and self-directed organizational activity of citizens
(Diamond, 1999, 249). It has been described as “a space of
citizen-directed collective action, located between the
8 Valerie Bunce (2008, 30) also emphasizes the importance of a “robust
and pluralist civil society” for a successful post-communist transition to
democracy.
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private proﬁt” (Henry and Sundstrom, 2006, 5). With the
wisdom that comes from broader comparative experience
that has accumulated since the 1980s, we now can see
how much the authors of democratic transition theory
took for granted the relatively high level of development
of the organizations of civil society in the countries from
which their generalizations had been derived. In general
the growth of independent social organizations under
states controlled by communist parties was far more
limited than in the nations of Southern Europe and South
America that moved toward democracy. In Russia, where
the Soviet model had been invented and where it had
been in place longer than anywhere else in the world, the
ruling party and state had created a network of organi-
zations that permeated the entire society and was
directed in detail by the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union (Evans, 2006). Since no legal, independent, orga-
nized groups were permitted, there was no civil society in
the Soviet Union, according to the usual Western
conception. Nevertheless, there was a burst of optimism
concerning the possibility for the rise of civil society in
the Soviet Union in the late 1980s when, as a part of
reforms introduced by Mikhail Gorbachev, “informal”
groups appeared and proliferated quickly. That phenom-
enon was followed by the emergence of the Democratic
Russia political movement, a quasi-party that supplied
active assistance for Boris Yeltsin’s victory in the presi-
dential election in the Russian republic of the USSR in
1991 (Sakwa, 2008, 130). The base of support for most of
the informal groups proved to be shallow, however, and
the Democratic Russia movement fragmented and dis-
appeared within a short time.
As was shown in a number of countries in the 1970s and
1980s, a strong civil society can play an important role in
a nation’s transition to democracy. Pressure from the
bottom up can interact with initiatives from the top down
to build momentum for institutional change. Once such
a transition has begun, independent social organizations
with substantial numbers of loyal members can be valuable
assets to members of the political elite who encounter
opposition to further change. Also, vigilance by vigorous
organizations outside the state can help to keep the leaders
of the transition on track if they begin to betray their ideals.
That did not happen in Russia when the Yeltsin adminis-
tration allowed the privatization of state assets to be
hijacked by avaricious insiders, and when the oligarchs
achieved dominance of political parties, the media, and
the government. Perhaps surprisingly, in the face of sharply
declining economic security during the 1990s, most of
the population of Russia withdrew from political life and
became cynical about parties and politicians (Gill and
Markwick, 2000, 249). During that decade most citizens
of Russia immersed themselves in the struggle for survival
as individuals or families, and had little hope for positive
political changes.
Despite the increase in the freedom to form nongov-
ernmental organizations in Russia after the fall of the
Communist Party and the Soviet state, civil society in Russia
was weak after the end of the old regime, as almost all
independent organizations were marginal in terms of theirsocial base, their ﬁnancial assets, their impact on society,
and their inﬂuence in politics (Evans, 2002). On the level
of popular attitudes, part of the cultural legacy of the Soviet
system was pervasive distrust of social organizations and
even of the whole public sphere. In addition, the deep
decline in the economymade it impossible formost citizens
to give ﬁnancial support to such organizations even if they
had been willing to. Finally, the evolution of the political
system placed a premium on exploiting personal connec-
tions with individuals in positions of power, rather than
the drawing support from sizable groups in society (Fish,
2001, 22). After 1991 the Yeltsin leadership deliberately
discouraged the mobilization of Russian citizens for orga-
nized political actions other than voting in electionsdand
Yeltsin’s lieutenants were not very successful in gaining
support from citizens in parliamentary elections. Relying
heavily on dominance by the institution of the presidency
and making deals with the oligarchs and governors, Yeltsin
sought to introduce change almost exclusively from the
top down. And yet, as Steven Fish has pointed out, in every
post-communist state “where democratization did not
happen or was initiated and then reversed, a top-down
dynamic has been at work” (Fish, 2005, 186). Fish adds that
“strong, autonomous societal organizations and networks
may not always be democracy’s allies, but their absence is
almost always democracy’s enemy” (Fish, 2005, 187).8 The
barriers to the development of civil society in Russia within
the Soviet system and the conditions causing weakness
in social organizations in post-communist Russia made it
easier for members of the elite to subvert reform and
guaranteed that there would be fewer restraints on the
tendency toward more authoritarian control after 2000. In
the words of Graeme Gill and Roger Markwick, “It has been
theweakness of such civil society forces in the Soviet Union
and Russia which has left excessive power in the hands
of political elites and undercut the emergence of a stable
and robust democracy” (Gill and Markwick, 2000, 251).5. The inﬂuence of historical factors
In recent years a number of scholars writing about post-
communist states have begun to search for the historical
roots of the patterns of change and continuity that have
been evident during the past two decades. That trend in
scholarly works reﬂects dissatisfactionwith earlier writings
which had attempted to explain the divergence in the
trajectories of post-communist states in terms of statistical
relationships between potential independent and depen-
dent variables, all of which had been measured by various
organizations, offering information that was readily avail-
able. When researchers found that the countries in which
noncommunist parties won clear victories over communist
parties in the ﬁrst competitive elections were likely to
achieve the most thorough political and economic trans-
formation, their ﬁnding was interesting, though not
surprising, and itwas dismissed byone scholar as “notmuch
9 In 2000, a survey by the Levada Center asked a representative sample
of Russians, “Which historic road should Russia follow?” Only 15 percent
of the respondents opted for the “European road,” and 18 percent favored
a return to the Soviet model, while 60 percent said that Russia should
follow “its own unique road” (Lukin, 2009, 83). A survey that was taken in
2005 found that 31 percent of Russians thought that Russia’s future lies
with the countries of Western Europe, while 69 percent said that their
country’s future lies with “countries in the CIS,” meaning other states that
formerly were part of the Soviet Union (Rose and Munro, 2008, 53).
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statistical relationships left unexplained “the why of the
why”dthe more fundamental question of “why some
countries managed to remove their communists from
power and why others did not” (Kopstein and Reilly, 1999,
614). The factors that serve as proximate explanatory vari-
ablesmaybe seen as “intervening links in a causal chain that
leads from the deep attributes to the political outcome”
(Møller and Skaaning, 2009, 316). Herbert Kitschelt has
commented, “Shallow explanations provide. high statis-
tical explanatory yields but little insight into the causal
genealogy of a phenomenon” (Kitschelt, 2003, 68). Deeper
causes may account for what is happening with both the
proximate independent variable and the dependent vari-
able in an apparent empirical relationship. Grigore Pop-
Eleches suggests that the results of initial competitive
elections “may be signals about the nature of historical
legacies, which drive the long-term prospects of democ-
racy” for post-communist states (Pop-Eleches, 2007, 921).
A growing number of studies have attempted to identify
the inﬂuence of crucial differences in the historical experi-
ences of nations that formerly were under communist rule.
Pop-Eleches argues persuasively that “historical legacies
have to constitute the starting point for any systematic
analysis of democratization in the post-communist context”
(Pop-Eleches, 2007, 909). Similarly, Grzegorz Ekiert
contends that “historical legacies determine the available
alternatives and make some institutional choices more
likely” in post-communist countries (Ekiert, 2003, 93).
Among those who examine historical backgrounds, some
scholars attach primary importance to the experiences of
the period of communist rule in various countries (Ekiert,
2003, 92–93; Kopstein, 2003, 233), while others trace the
sources of post-communist differences back to the histor-
ical legacies of those countries before the creation of
communist regimes (Kopstein, 2003, 239; Pop-Eleches,
2005, 15, 25). All of those scholars would agree that
historical, cultural, and geographical factors play a large
role in accounting for the divergence in the political and
economic paths of post-communist nations, which has
become more pronounced from the early 1990s to the
present (Pop-Eleches, 2007, 914).
Among post-communist nations, those in which
a consensus of most segments of the elite and the public
was committed to a radical break with the old system
have been much more successful in carrying out market-
ization and democratization (Orenstein, 2001, 43). Valerie
Bunce (2006, 607) points out that in some countries in
Eastern Europe “democratic breakthroughs” were based
on a “widespread societal consensus that produced early
and sustained economic reforms and democratic deep-
ening.” Such an overwhelming consensus among social
groups in favor of fundamental change was not present in
Russia in the early 1990s. That crucial contrast between
Russia and the countries in Eastern Europe that have gone
farther in institutionalizing democratic processes can be
explained primarily by differences in historical legacies. As
Bunce puts it, in the countries in Eastern Europe that have
made successful transitions to democracy, “a liberal agenda
combined with a nationalist agenda” (Bunce, 2003, 178). In
some countries in Eastern Europe, such as Poland andHungary, there was the historical memory of intervention
by Tsarist Russia to block their striving for national libera-
tion. In most of the region, the imposition of communist
regimes after the Second World War ensured that in the
minds of the local population those systems would be
associated indelibly with Soviet domination. As a result,
the people of Eastern European countries felt closer to
the West, and to Europe in particular, than ever before
(Brown, 1991, 262). Bunce observes that “state socialism
had created in some countries a popular consensus around
democratization, if only because democracy represented
the polar opposite of the authoritarian regime” (Bunce,
2001, 57). In the post-communist period, democracy and
a market economy represented not only a different way
of life, but also the promise of integration with the West
and independence from Russia, creating a fusion of liberal
ideology and nationalism. In several countries in Eastern
Europe after 1989–1991, the replacement of the old
order was simultaneously “a process of national liberation”
(Bunce, 1995, 120), which generated more determined
support for a course of radical change (Bunce, 2000, 719).
In Russia, however, therewas a lack of a consensus at the
elite and popular levels about the desired character of
political and economic transformation (Bunce, 2004, 229;
Easter, 2008, 225; Goldman, 2003, 68). The combination of
historical conditions that had created a strong anti-
communist consensus in most of Eastern Europe had not
taken shape in Russia. The Russians did not have a reason
tobelieve that the Soviet systemhadbeen forced on themby
a foreignpower, or to see that systemas blocking aspirations
for national independence. In Russia, the predominant
attitude toward a rapprochement with the West was much
more ambivalent (Appel, 2004, 170), and the majority of
citizens had no desire to cast their futurewith Europe.9 That
is not surprising, because for centuries Russians had viewed
Europewith deep ambivalence (Stent, 2007, 398–399, 435).
As Hillary Appel remarks, “the rejection of the communist
past in favor of a Western liberal regime has often been
interpreted inpost-Soviet Russia as a repudiation of Russia’s
past and national character,” and as even demeaning to
aspects of one’s own personal history (Appel, 2004, 170,
173). Appel notes that in theCzechRepublic in the1990s, the
privatization of industry could be portrayed as anti-
communist, pro-European, and therefore essentially in
accordance with Czech character (Appel, 2004, 20, 173). In
Poland, the consensus based on nationalism lengthened the
time horizon of the public in favor of economic trans-
formation, producing persistence of support for the main
direction of change (Bunce, 2005, 436).
In post-communist Russia, on the other hand, there
was no consensus among the public in favor of the
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2003, 65–66). Alexander Lukin reports that the substantial
degree of disillusionment with the Soviet system among
the population of Russia “was caused not by a desire to live
in a Western-type society, but rather by a desire to live in
a system that was different from the Stalinist system”
(Lukin, 2009, 67). Surveys of the Russians showed not
only that there was no overwhelming rejection of the old
political and economic system, but also that there was
a lack of general agreement in favor of a new set of insti-
tutions.10 In that country, the “deep popular ambivalence”
toward radical change in the economy (Gustafson,1999, 21)
led the Yeltsin leadership to buy the support of interests
in the elite by making concessions that undermined the
realization of some of the key goals of privatization, as we
have seen (Appel, 2004, 81, 175; Bunce, 2004, 224; Rutland,
2006, 78). Those compromises institutionalized partial
and distorted reform, with political and economic conse-
quences that became fully evident only after the 1990s, but
were of the sort that Joel Hellman had predicted. The
absence of a fusion of democratization and national liber-
ation in Russia was a major reason for the lack of a clear
national consensus in favor of political and economic
transformation, with profound implications for the course
of reform in that country.
6. Conclusions
The evidence presented in this article makes it clear
that the model of transition derived from changes that had
occurred in a number of countries in Southern Europe and
South America in the 1970s and 1980s did not hold up well
when it traveled to Russia and the other post-communist
states. Perhaps the one point made by transitologists that
has proved to have themost general applicability is that in a
period of instability, the actions of political elites are
of particular importance. Instability enhances the opportu-
nity for political leaders to engage in the restructuring
of political institutions and policies. Having acknowledged
that insight from the transitologists, wemust add that their
point of viewwas limitedbydistinctivehistorical conditions
and geographical boundariesmuchmore than they realized.
Almost all the transitions that were the basis of their model
took place in nations that had been ruled by the military10 In 1992, when major economic reform began under Yeltsin, 50
percent of Russians gave a positive evaluation of the political system that
had existed “before the start of perestroika” (before the Gorbachev
period), and 62 percent gave a positive assessment of the economic
system that had been in place at the same time. In sharp contrast, only 14
percent approved the political system that was operating in 1992, and
only 10 percent positively evaluated the “current economic system” of
that year (Rose and Munro, 2002, 63; Rose et al., 2004, 203; Rose, Mishler,
and Munro, 2006, 154). The percentage of respondents giving a positive
evaluation of the old (Soviet) political and economic system increased
steadily during the 1990s, which says something about the population’s
reaction to the changes that took place in that decade. In each year from
1992 on, “the percentage of Russians [who were] positive about the
former communist regime has always been greater than that endorsing
the current regime” (Rose et al., 2006, 132). On public opinion in Russia
about the communist regime and the new regime, as expressed when
radical economic reform began under Yeltsin, see also (White, Rose, and
McAllister 1997, 181–182).(Geddes, 1999, 131); none took place in a country that had
beenunder a single-party regime that subdued the state and
the military as thoroughly as in the Soviet Union. In each of
the nations where those earlier transitions took place, the
basic institutions of a market economy had already devel-
oped before a political transition began. In no country in
Southern Europe or South America that moved toward
democracy had social organizations been as thoroughly
controlled by a single ruling party as in most of the nations
under communist rule, and in none of those countries that
had gone through earlier transitions had the growth of civil
societybeenblockedasﬁrmlyas in theSovietUnion. Thekey
thesis of the transitological literature, that of the positive
effects of pacts between moderate reformers and moderate
defenders of the old order, has proved inapplicable in rela-
tion to the post-communist states.
One of the main lessons from the course of events in
Russia from the early 1990s to the present is that the change
away fromone form of authoritarian rule, which usually has
been labeled as a transition to democracy, is not irreversible.
Some democratic transitions may prove to be shallow
(Ottaway, 2003, 165), and the changes in post-communist
Russiahaveprovidedagoodexampleof a shallowtransition.
The introduction of democratic institutions of government
and competing political parties may not prove to be
a breakthrough to democracy. The metaphor of a break-
through implies a decisive changewith lasting results, even
if that is not asserted explicitly. Stable democracy depends
on the existence of amulti-layered infrastructure, including
not only competing political parties, independent mass
media, and protection for individual rights, but alsodon
adeeper leveldsupportiveeconomicand social institutions.
In most countries that have made successful transitions
from authoritarianism to democracy in recent decades,
large parts of that infrastructure had come into being as
a result of gradual economic and social changes before
the old authoritarian regime entered its last years.
As was mentioned earlier in this article, the scholarly
literature on transitions to democracy that appeared after
the early 1980s departed from the emphasis of the writings
of the previous decades, which had focused on the growth
of social, economic, and cultural conditions for the insti-
tutionalization of democracy in the political system. In
recent years the limitations built into the approach of the
transition paradigm have become apparent. The experience
of Russia, which leaders in Western Europe and North
America had regarded as the most important test case for
democratization in the 1990s, may prompt us to return to
the study of the long-term trends facilitating or inhibiting
the growth of democratic institutions. Thomas Carothers
has urged that we do so: “As the third wave has aged, .
and many ‘transitional countries’ have fallen short of early
hopes, the importance of underlying conditions and
structures for democratic success has become increasingly
apparent” (Carothers, 2007, 24).11 A return to the study of11 Thomas Carothers had offered a similar warning earlier: “Recent
events highlight the folly of ignoring the broad set of social, political, and
economic factors bearing on democratization” (Carothers, 1997, 93). A
number of scholars continued to ignore his warning, however.
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might help to overcome the excessive optimism that has
been exhibited bymany scholars and political leaders in the
West in recent decades. For some years, as Peter Rutland
says, “building democracy and building a market economy
were assumed to be compatible and complementary
processes which could be introduced to any country on the
planet” (Rutland, 2000, 244). That optimism produced
a tendency to believe that a country had entered a transi-
tion to democracy if its old authoritarian leadership had
been replaced and the new leadership of the country
claimed that it was devoted to the values of democracy.
Western leaders were slow to admit that they had been
naïve in their assessment of Russia’s executive leadership
in the 1990s. After a few years of supporting the Yeltsin
administration, the Clinton administration in the United
States had too much of a stake in Yeltsin to admit the depth
of the problems that he had created. After Putin replaced
Yeltsin, President George W. Bush continued to praise
Russia’s executive leadership as democratically oriented
even as late as 2003.12 The leaders who undermined the
success of a democratic transition in Russia in the 1990s
and those who introduced more authoritarian rule in the
next decade were the same ones whom Western leaders
had regarded as the main agents of democratization in
that nation.
In the 1990s the transition paradigm that had been
created in the 1980s seized the imagination of the leaders
and the public in some Western countries, and especially
in the USA. Now it is time for that model to lose its grip on
our consciousness. That is one of the main lessons to be
learned from the disappointment of earlier expectations for
a transition to democracy in post-communist Russia. In
light of the course of recent change in that country, one
might expect that the illusions encouraged by that model
would have been left behind by scholars who specialize
in the study of the politics of Russia, but there are signs that
some prominent scholars who write about Russia are still
thinking within the frame of reference of the transition
paradigm. It was understandable that as late as 2000,
Michael McFaul and Sarah Mendelson could assert that
Russia was “midstream” in a radical transformation as it
moved toward democracy and a market economy (McFaul
and Mendelson, 2000, 348). It was surprising, however,
that in 2005, after Vladimir Putin had been in power for
several years, McFaul urged that the United States should
try to strengthen “those reformers still ﬁghting for
democracy” in Russia, because “over the long run,
strengthening those forces will help to democratize Russia”
(McFaul, 2005, 400). His words provide an example of
a scholar who was promoting an illusion by trying to
persuade his audience that Russiawas still in a transition to
democracy and that support for the pro-Western segment
of the Russian intelligentsia offered a realistic prospect for
the successful completion of that transition. In reality, the12 President George W. Bush said in September 2003, “I respect Presi-
dent Putin’s vision for Russia: a country at peace with its neighbors and
with the world, a country in which democracy and freedom and rule of
law thrive” (McFaul, 2005, 33).liberal intelligentsia constitute a small minority in their
own society, and their ideas have not won widespread
support among the majority of Russians (Fish, 1996, 107;
Gill and Markwick, 2000, 255; Rose, Munro, and Mishler,
2004, 213). Relying primarily on that section of society to
bring political change in Russia has brought disappoint-
ment in the past, and it is sure to bring disappointment in
the future if Western leaders persist in that habit. That
approach is not received well by the majority of Russians. It
makesWesterners appear to be either naive (well-meaning
but clueless) or cynical (disguising ulterior motives), and
neither reading of our actions is likely to inspiremuch trust.
It is time to stop looking at Russia as if it were in the
middle of an incomplete transition. There was a transition
in Russia, but it did not go where many Western scholars
had hoped. We should heed the advice that the late James
Millar sagely offered several years ago: “The transition is
over. Get over it” (Millar, 2000). A growing body of schol-
arly literature in the ﬁeld of comparative politics seeks
to delineate the dynamics of semi-authoritarian regimes
(Brownlee, 2007; Ottaway, 2003; Smith and Zeigler, 2008;
Zakaria, 1997). That trend reﬂects the fact that many of
the supposed transitions to democracy proved to be
shallow, like that in Russia. Increasingly, scholars writing
about semi-authoritarian or “hybrid” regimes recognize
that many of those regimes are likely to persist for a long
time (Rose and Shin, 2001, 333; Diamond, 2002, 23). It is
worth noting, however, that during the last few years
there has been an increase in research on the factors
affecting stability and instability in semi-authoritarian
states. The study of contemporary Russian politics should
draw insights from that literature and add to our knowl-
edge of the character of semi-authoritarian political
systems. Some recent writings on the regime that was
crafted by Vladimir Putin have begun to do that (March,
2009; Robertson, 2009). An approach to Russia that is
informed by “historically grounded realism”(Pop-Eleches,
2007, 925) is likely to yield information that is more
useful for scholars, the public, and political leaders.References
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